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Abstract
In this paper we describe and analyse a demographic data base that has been gathered for
several EU countries under a research project called AGIR. The project tries to establish facts
and evidence on the ageing process in EU countries and relate this process with health and
retirement issues. Five dimensions of the ageing process have been considered: population,
mortality, longevity, lifecourses and morbidity. Conventionally measured ageing can be
caused by low fertility and longer lives and EU countries have experienced both. We
emphasise the considerable compression of mortality that has taken place and conclude that
there are still ample margin for this development to continue. Beyond age groups ratios we
show that ages at major individual lifetime landmarks have been evolving in a way that may
not be mutually compatible. As for how health status interacts with ageing, we do not see a
clear picture emerging out of the little data available, although a simple exercise controlling
by education of different cohorts tells us that European populations would probably grow
healthier as they grow older.
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This paper contains a summary of a wider report prepared by the authors as part of
the AGIR project. National teams participating in a first phase of the project gathered
comprehensive data on population, mortality, longevity, lifecourses and morbidity (health
and disability) for a number of EU countries so that we were able to summarise and
elaborate on these data in various directions. Data would come mostly from national
sources and from the European Community Household Panel, but for completeness we have
also used data from “The Human Mortality Database” (www.mortality.org).
1 Countries
covered are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
The various directions we have followed to illustrate the European ageing process
are:
(i) population, that is, the longest possible time series of historical and projected (2050)
total population (at 31
st December) data by year gender and age (0 to 100 and/or more) to
which annual number of births by gender has been added, (ii) mortality or deaths for the
same years as before, by gender, year of birth and age, as well as complete life-tables by
gender and both genres (survivors) for as many years (historical and projected) as possible,
(iii) longevity for the same years as before (projections when needed) represented through a
series of longevity indicators by gender and both genres, (iv) lifecourses, that is, major
passage events in the lifecycle, or rather the ages at which these happen, concerning
schooling, activity, household formation, parenthood, inactivity, etc. and (v) morbidity
indicators out of survey data on self-perceived health status and disability by age and
gender.
After a first and rather descriptive exploitation of the data gathered, we see that an
overall picture emerges showing us an ageing process that deserves a much closer analysis
well beyond its aggregate (or age groups) manifestations. An analysis focused on the
                                          
1 Most of the data comes from the national Statistical Offices of the countries included although the AGIR teams
have been responsible for gathering, documenting and manipulating the raw data. Where needed, these data has
been completed with data from the Human Mortality Database of University of California, Berkeley (USA), and
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany) [Available at www.mortality.org or
www.humanmortality.de]. Finally, data from the database “La conjoncture des pays développés en chiffres” of
the Institut National d’Études Démographiques (available at http://www.ined.fr/bdd/demogr/#) has provided us
with valuable data for all countries included here.4
individual and biologic aspects of ageing. These aspects are having profound impact on the
way individuals and households organise their lifecycle.
European and other western countries, that completed their major demographic
transition of the modern era well before the mid of the twentieth century, initiated almost
without interruption a “second demographic transition” (van de Kaa, 1987) that has lasted
for almost half a century. This second transition can be characterised by a sharp decline in
fertility as rapid change in lifestyles and family/work arrangements took place after the
births boom of WWII post-war. A pronounced ageing trend is now on course in these
nations so that the age structure of the population as well as any other indicator concerning
basic individual and aggregate lifecycle landmarks display a dramatic record of change that
will most likely not be interrupted in the coming decades. These trends, in turn, will trigger
intense adaptation both from individuals themselves and also from existing institutions
resulting in behavioural change to cope with new challenges, limiting risks and enhancing
opportunities.
Concerning demography we are interested in population dynamics as defined by
vegetative forces, that is, births and deaths. We also deal in more detail with survival and
longevity, as experienced in Europe in the last half century in order to ascertain whether it
is the absolute limit to human life or, rather, the fact that more and more people reach
extreme ages what drives the current ageing process. Two other phenomena require our
interest when focusing in the circumstances among which ageing is taking place at present.
On the one hand, the fact that typical “lifecourses” in western countries are witnessing
seemingly contradictory developments concerning, for instance, life duration and early
retirement or other lifecycle landmarks. On the other hand, and most important, the issue
of how healthy and/or disability free are the extra years that otherwise medical services are,
among other factors, helping the population as a whole to afford.
All these areas (populations, mortality, longevity, lifecourses and morbidity) are
extremely intertwined and their interactions happen within a context of uninterrupted
economic and technological advancement with which the former also interact. Our aim thus
is to extract out of the abundant data on the areas just mentioned those facts, patterns and
trends that better characterise the demographic process of western Europe in the last half
century.5
We have organised the paper into three major sections on demography ( Section 2),
lifecourses (Section 3) and morbidity (Section 4) that will help us to organise the summary
description of our database and the discussion of the major findings and its comparative
dimension. A final Section 5 will try to answer tentatively some questions that can be
summarised in three very relevant ones indeed: (i) what means living longer? (ii) is living
longer and working less mutually compatible? and (iii) means living longer living better? It
turns out, ironically, that how we define ageing depends on the answers we may give to all
these questions.
2
2.  Demographic trends since 1950
Western populations, as it is well known, have experienced a considerable change in
the last half century. In EU countries, with few exceptions, population has not ceased to
increase albeit at lower and lower rates due to the resulting effect of two compensating
driving forces, that is, fewer births and increased life years. To this balance, immigration
has been contributing on the plus side in most countries. Of course, each country has
experienced different population dynamics, basically due to different timing in their baby-
booms and intensity of immigration flows, but all of them are now witnessing a
considerable “ageing” of their populations. A process that will change to higher gears in
the coming decades.
2.1.  Population
Table 2.1 shows population figures (first column) and derived population indicators
for ten EU countries and selected years 1950, 1975 and 2000. It can be seen that population
growth has diminished everywhere although countries like France or the United Kingdom
have succeeded in keeping a relatively high population growth through sustained fertility
and immigration whereas Spain has most recently experienced high immigration flows and
Ireland has both kept high fertility and reversed migration flows.
                                          
2 The word “ageing” will be used through most of this paper with its standard meaning concerning the increased
average age of a given population, or of its aged persons ratios computed around 65 years of age. Ageing
however can be defined on the basis of a given general health and ability status of a representative individual
which would result in a completely different picture.6
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1950 8,645 0.30 1.033 6.10 11.12 35.45
1975 9,807 0.24 1.043 4.59 13.96 35.82 Belgium
2000 10,263 0.24 1.045 3.89 16.85 39.30
1950 4,252 0.96 1.016 7.24 8.96 32.54
1975 5,055 0.38 1.019 4.83 13.26 35.40 Denmark
2000 5,368 0.36 1.023 4.50 14.83 38.76
1950 69,346 0.63 1.170 6.90 9.73 34.64
1975 78,465 -0.53 1.109 4.26 14.97 36.56 Germany
2000 82,038 -0.15 1.054 4.17 16.32 40.36
1950 30,583
1975 35,813 1.11 1.044 5.91 10.52 32.68 Spain
2000 40,122 0.98 1.043 4.04 16.93 39.35
1950 3,986 1.31 0.988 9.61 6.64 29.74
1975 4,720 0.22 0.974 6.26 10.77 33.95 Finland
2000 5,181 0.19 1.007 4.46 15.00 38.88
1950 41,614 0.87 1.081 5.83 11.36 34.81
1975 52,606 0.55 1.041 4.67 13.40 34.52 France
2000 58,754 0.41 1.054 4.18 15.61 37.79
1950 2,961 -0.31 0.965
1975 2,978 8.21 0.991 5.20 11.08 31.67 Ireland
2000 3,787 1.51 1.014 5.99 11.16 34.54
1950 47,516 0.53 1.043 8.01 8.20 31.48
1975 55,293 0.66 1.047 5.34 11.93 34.50 Italy
2000 57,680 0.12 1.060 3.76 17.97 40.86
1950 6,978 0.91 1.009 6.58 10.14 34.36
1975 8,193 0.39 1.011 4.10 15.69 37.74 Sweden
2000 8,872 0.16 1.023 3.64 17.71 40.26
1950 50,490 0.70 1.083 6.13 10.93 35.19
1975 56,231 -0.01 1.056 4.44 14.13 35.97
United
Kingdom
2000 59,756 0.43 1.028 4.20 15.59 38.32
(a)  As of 31
st December, in thousands
(b) Number of persons of between 15 and 64 years of age per person of 65 or more.
(c)  Number of persons of 65 or more per 100 persons of any age.
Note. Data in this table come from the following sources: National Statistical Offices (Provided by
the AGIR-WP1 Teams), INED (www.ined.fr/bdd/demogr/) and the Human Mortality Database
[University of California, Berkeley (USA) and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data downladed on May
2003)].
Although in a typical year, everywhere, more boys are born than girls, the different
death probabilities that affect each group cause that with few exceptions the gender balance
in a given population tips towards the female side. This is apparent in Table 2.1 (third
column) in the four largest countries of the EU, although Nordic countries and Ireland have7
kept in the last decades a closer balance among genders that has been nevertheless tipping
recently towards the more standard female bias (Figure 2.3).
As for total population, Figure 2.1 shows more eloquently how in general
population size has been growing less rapidly since 1975 after when the oil crisis almost
stopped migration flows and fertility started to decline dramatically. More recently many
EU countries have been experiencing intense immigration flows what has resulted in an
stimulus to population growth.
Figure 2.1













        Source: Table 2.1
The dynamics of total population hides however the dramatic developments that
have been the norm in EU countries concerning the age structure of the population and
related age ratios. Table 2.1 (columns fourth to sixth) shows three of these indicators: the
“support ratio” which is the inverse of the aged dependency ratio, the “aged (persons)
ratio” and the average age of the population.
3 Two different trends can be observed around
these indicators that are also pictured separately in Figures 2.2 to 2.4.
Support ratios diminished appreciably everywhere between 1950 and 1975. That is,
the number of persons of working age per person aged 65 or more fell from 6 and more to
between 4 to 5 and fell again between 1975 and 2000 to around 4. In countries like
Belgium, Sweden and Italy this ratio is now well below 4 whereas in Ireland it has
increased to a very high level of 6.
                                          
3 See notes to Table 2.1 for definitions.8
Figure 2.2











        Source: Table 2.1 (see also Table for definition)
Ageing however, has advanced in a different and more mixed fashion as can be seen
in Figure 2.3. With the exception of Ireland, the share of persons aged 65 and more in total
population has doubled from around 8 (with large variance however) in 1950 till now. This
development has been more rapid in the sixties and seventies than afterwards in Denmark,
Germany, Sweden or the United Kingdom whereas in the rest of the countries considered
the pace has been more regular and particularly intense in Italy or Spain. Ireland has hardly
experienced that kind of ageing in the recent decades.
Figure 2.3
















        Source: Table 2.1 (see also Table for definition)
When we define ageing though average age of the population, we observe that it has
been happening particularly since 1975. In 1950, average age of the population in most9
countries stayed around 33.5 years, increased to almost 35 years in 1975 and more than
doubled this increase in the period 1975-2000 to reach the almost 39 years observed at
present. This is probably the single best indicator of how a given population ages through
time in the sense expressed before that ageing is just getting older in terms of pure age.
Figure 2.4











        Source: Table 2.1
Whereas age ratios may have a more complex dynamics depending on the cutting
age at which the line is drawn, average age computations give every age the corresponding
cohort weight and thus captures in a continuous fashion the passage of generations of
different age. We will come back latter to this point when discussing population
projections.
2.2.  Births and fertility
Letting apart migrations, that we are not considering in this report, births and deaths
determine the vegetative movement of populations. Both developments have suffered
dramatic changes in EU countries since 1950. To be sure, the demographic transition that
Western countries initiated in the first half of the XIX century has been unparalleled by the
developments since 1950, but what has been different is the fact that fertility rates fell
below replacement levels around 1970. This development holds the key to the ageing
process that will accelerate in the near decades in EU countries, although unexpected
change in either compression or expansion of survival will undoubtedly exacerbate ageing
in the longer term.10
Table 2.2 shows absolute numbers of births and derived indicators for our ten EU
countries in 1950, 1975 and 2000. Most countries initiated their baby-booms just after
World War II and finished them around 1970 (first column). Almost in every countries
male births exceed female ones by about 5.5 % and the evidence shows that this fact is
getting an even more strong profile in a majority of countries (third column). Birth rates
suffered in that period most of their decline in the second half of the twentieth century and
nearly stabilised afterwards (second column). Fertility rates, correspondingly, fell below
replacement levels also around 1970 (fourth column).11
Table 2.2
Births and fertility indicators for (selected) EU countries 1950-2000






1950 145,672 16.85 1.055 2.34
1975 119,693 12.20 1.059 1.74 Belgium
2000 114,883 11.19 1.048 1.66
1950 79,558 18.71 1.049 2.57
1975 72,071 14.26 1.044 1.92 Denmark
2000 67,081 12.59 1.055 1.77
1950 1,116,701 16.10 1.074 2.1
1975 782,310 9.97 1.061 1.48 Germany
2000 770,744 9.38 1.058 1.36
1950 565,378 20.11 1.055 2.48
1975 669,378 18.69 1.072 2.80 Spain
2000 397,632 9.91 1.071 1.24
1950 98,065 24.60 1.055 3.16
1975 65,719 13.92 1.060 1.68 Finland
2000 56,742 10.95 1.064 1.73
1950 862,310 20.60 1.051 2.93
1975 745,065 14.10 1.051 1.93 France
2000 726,768 13.20 1.055 1.89
1950 63,565 21.4 3.41
1975 67,178 21.7 3.43 Ireland
2000 54,239 14.4 1.89
1950 908,622 18.12 1.058 2.5
1975 827,852 14.97 1.061 2.17 Italy
2000 538,999 9.34 1.064 1.23
1950 115,414 16.5 1.070 2.28
1975 103,632 12.65 1.057 1.77 Sweden
2000 90,441 10.19 1.064 1.54
1950 818421 16.2 1.062
1975 697,518 12.40 1.062 1.81 United Kingdom
2000 679,029 11.4 1.053 1.65
(a)  Number of births per 1000 population
Note. Data in this table come from the following sources: National Statistical
Offices (provided by the AGIR-WP1 Teams), INED
(http://www.ined.fr/bdd/demogr/) and the Human Mortality Database [University
of California, Berkeley (USA) and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
(Germany). Available at www.mortality.org or www.humanmortality.de (data
downladed on May 2003)].
Figure 2.5 allows a closer approach to country differences. Of course, the absolute
numbers shown concerning births tell us immediately about “large” and “small” countries
in the EU in terms of population, but above all tell us about the timing of the birth-booms
in every country. Belgium Germany, Finland, France, and the United Kingdom had ended
their booms well by 1975 keeping afterwards stable number of total births. Spain initiated12
her baby-boom in the mid sixties an ended it after 1975 to start a fast decline in fertility that
almost halved the size of new born cohorts in less than twenty years. Italy too has followed
a similar pattern of recent decline in fertility although joined the European baby-boom just
described much earlier.
Figure 2.5













Around 1950, birth rates were well above 15 births per thousand inhabitants with
countries like Spain, Finland, France and Ireland above the level of 20. Fifty tears later,
birth rates in most countries stand around 10 per thousand with the exception of France and
Ireland that are closer to 15 rather. Again, in most countries, the larger part of this
development happened before 1975 except in Spain, Ireland and Italy where it took place
mostly in the recent decades (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.6












Source: Table 2.2 (see also Table for definition)13
Everywhere male births exceed female ones by between 5 and 7 per cent, despite de
fact that within the whole population women are more numerous than men due to gender
related death risks. Although not everywhere, this gap has been growing steadily in the last
50 years. The exceptions, among the countries considered, are Belgium, Germany, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
The sharpest differences however can be seen when comparing fertility ratios
(Figure 2.7). Again, in almost every country fertility ratios fell from an (unweighted)
average level of 2.5 in 1950 to 2, just below the replacement level, in 1975 and 1.6 in
2000. What seems an stead decline however hides the fact that countries like Spain and
Ireland kept or even increased their fertility rates all through the 1050-1975 period while
the rest actually decreased their fertility rates much rapidly in the same period. In Spain and
Italy, fertility bottomed at nearly 1 child per women during the nineties to regain slightly
higher levels in the recent past. Again, the Spanish, Irish and Italian cases explain the fall
in average fertility for the whole group for fertility rates did not change much in the rest of
the countries in the 1975-2000 period.
Figure 2.7
















Falling mortality has been, jointly with lower fertility, the driving force of the
demographic transition that has taken place in Western Europe since the fifties last century.
But as fertility rates bounced some few years ago to start a modest upwards run, mortality
risk continues to diminish everywhere for almost all ages. Mortality is measured in14
different ways. Measured as a per cent or per thousand rate against total population in a
given country, mortality could go up as population grows older thus hiding more genuine
developments. In this section we will approach the clear-cut phenomenon of falling
mortality looking first at observed death risks by age and its evolution through time and
latter we will analyse survival probabilities computed for different EU countries out of their
respective life tables.
Up to the sixties last century, falling infant mortality was the mayor cause of longer
survival among individuals. More recently increased survival at high or even extreme ages
has taken the lead. Even since around 1975 observed death risk at almost any age has fallen
in a significant amount everywhere. We compute this risk as the number of observed deaths
of given age over total population of that age in any particular year. However, in order to
make meaningful comparisons between countries and through time we use the ratio between
observed risks at two extreme years in a given period of time (2000 over 1975) to
summarise in a single indicator a factor of change of that standard measure of mortality.
Table 2.3 shows this ratio computed for nine EU countries and selected ages and Figure 2.8
displays the age profile of this ratio. Remember that a value of, say, 0.7 for the ratio at age
17 means that the death probability of an individual of that age has fallen in 2000 down to a
70 per cent of its value in 1975. In particular, it can be seen that in the last twenty five
years, infant mortality risk has fallen in most EU countries to a third of what it was in
1975, or that adult mortality risk (ages 20 to 50) has fallen in the same period by between
30 and 35 per cent. Mortality risk at higher ages (60 to 80) has fallen even more than mid
age mortality risk reaching nearly 60 per cent of its level in 1975.15
Table 2.3
Mortality risk in 2000 relative to its value in 1975 for selected ages – EU countries
B DK D E F FIN IT SW UK Average
0 0.30 0.45 0.24 0.23 0.36 0.38 0.24 0.40 0.43 0.32
5 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.43 0.26 0.37 0.29
10 0.39 0.44 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.49 0.47 0.36 0.54 0.45
20 0.74 0.54 0.52 0.79 0.57 0.87 0.88 0.75 0.73 0.68
30 0.72 0.70 0.42 0.77 0.85 0.74 0.96 0.50 0.99 0.69
40 0.70 0.73 0.66 0.85 0.72 0.66 0.67 0.45 0.78 0.67
50 0.73 0.80 0.53 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.64
60 0.55 0.71 0.40 0.64 0.72 0.63 0.59 0.67 0.63 0.60
70 0.53 0.87 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.74 0.63 0.67 0.62
80 0.59 0.81 0.41 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.93 0.67 0.70 0.63
Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed with data
from www.mortality.org.
Figure 2.8 allows a better perspective of the age pattern of the mortality risk ratios
for each country. It is apparent that major gains have been the norm at ages below 10 and
between 50 and 80. At extreme ages, computations lack precision due to the rarity of cases
to be dealt with, but from the figure we can infer that as age increases gains in decreased
mortality risk get smaller and smaller. This is an indication of very limited “expansion” of
human life, almost null at extreme ages, whereas the observed gains at ages 50 to 80 is an
strong evidence of “compression” of the survival curve. In other words, populations age
not because the observed limit to human life increases, but because more and more people












































































































































































































































































































































Countries where gains of the sort described above have been Germany, Finland and
Sweden, while Denmark, the United Kingdom and Italy have performed more poorly on
this account. Spain or Belgium have had mixed results performing below average (less
gains) at ages until 45 and above average (more gains) after that age.
Survivors
The significant gains in survival have had also a parallel development in what
concerns the increase of persons of ages above 50 years everywhere. We have used the life
tables of EU countries, available many of them since mid past century, to compute a simple
ratio of theoretical survivors (out of a generation of 100,000 individuals of both genres) of
any age in 2000 with respect to same age survivors in 1975 or 1950, given data availability.
These ratios are shown in Table 2.4 for selected ages.
Table 2.4
Survivors ratio (2000 over ca. 1975 or ca. 1950) by selected age – EU countries
Ratios 2000 over ca. 1950 Ratios 2000 over ca. 1975
BD KD
(West) F SW Average E FI IT UK Average
1 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01
10 1.06 1.03 1.04 1.06 1.02 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01
20 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.05 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.02
30 1.08 1.04 1.06 1.08 1.04 1.06 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.02
40 1.10 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.05 1.07 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.02
50 1.14 1.06 1.08 1.13 1.06 1.09 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.02 1.03
60 1.21 1.08 1.13 1.20 1.11 1.15 1.06 1.08 1.08 1.05 1.07
70 1.40 1.15 1.27 1.39 1.24 1.29 1.14 1.22 1.16 1.12 1.16
80 1.95 1.46 1.87 2.08 1.75 1.82 1.44 1.56 1.40 1.23 1.41
90 3.84 3.18 4.75 5.17 4.02 4.19 2.42 2.55 2.25 1.43 2.16
100 6.83 15.31 21.33 14.32 14.25 14.41 3.15 7.74 5.44
Note. Ratios computed at extreme ages should be regarded with caution given the small numbers on
which their computation is based.
Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed with data from
www.mortality.org.
Given that mortality risk is typically low at ages below 60, even significant
decreases do not make the number of survivors to increase dramatically. In fact below that
age, it is hard to see that survivors of a typical generation born today would increase above
10 (20) per cent of those estimated for a typical generation born 25 (50) years ago.
However, above 60 years of age, the survivors ratio may increase dramatically. Fifty years18
ago, typically, only 30% of a theoretical generation was expected to be alive at age 80. For
a generation born today up to 60 per cent of its members could reach that age. This means
a factor of 2, or a factor of 5 for age 90, and so on. Until, of course, past the limit age of a
human life, the ration would collapse.
After certain ages the survivors ratio increase in an exponential way, even through
more recent periods. Again, of course, the fact that more and more people survives until
the limit age, means that one should not expect any further dramatic increase in survivors
ratios  in the next decades unless we consider very high ages. But the run is still long as a
generation born in 2050 would still keep 80 per cent of its numbers in 2130 as compared to
60 percent for a generation born today in a “business as usual” scenario, a factor of 1.33
that compares relatively well with a factor of 1.4 for the period 1975-2000 or 1.8 for the
period 1950-2000. France, Belgium and (West) Germany have pioneered, in general, these
developments.
2.4.  Longevity
After having looked at mortality and survival developments in EU countries in the
last few decades, we turn to the description and analysis of various indicators of longevity.
Representative individuals in western countries live longer and longer as it is well known
and can be documented thoroughly through the data so far discussed in this report.
Moreover, it is also apparent that, rather than a higher limit age of human life, what causes
the ageing of the population is the fact that more and more people reaches extreme ages
below that limit.
There are a number of ways in which we can approach longevity, that is, the
growing of age of representative individuals. One important corollary of the causes of
ageing discussed before is that the distribution of the duration of individual life for the
members of a given generation is becoming more “egalitarian” with the extreme case being
all members of a theoretical generation living exactly until the limiting age. This, however,
as discussed before, is still far from being the case.
In order to discuss this issue as documented from the data gathered under the AGIR
project, we have obtained several measures of longevity. They are presented and defined in
Table 2.5 and Figures 2.9 to 2.14. In order to provide a compact presentation, Table 2.5
only shows selected years, whilst each graph refers to one indicator at a time for those19
same selected years except Figure 2.14 that refers to the whole period 1950-2000 for record
age. It has been argued already about the fact that more and more people reach extreme
ages, the discussion in this section is a bit different and refers to the evolution of those
extreme ages irrespective of the number of people that reaches them.
The most generally accepted measure of longevity is life expectancy, at birth or at
later ages. It can be seen in Table 2.5 that this indicator has not ceased to increase in the
last decades everywhere. However this indicator, like most of which we will define later
on, is computed out of lifetables results for theoretical generations born in any year. There
is not apparent deceleration in this trend for, on average, life expectancy has augmented of
5 years of age every 25 time years.20
Table 2.5











1950 67.4 73.4 76 87.0
1975 72.5 76.1 79 88.7 106 Belgium
2000 78.3 81.7 86 93.1 110
1950 70.3 75.3 77 87.3 102
1975 74.1 77.5 82 90.4 108 Denmark
2000 76.8 79.5 80 92.3 110
1950 66.6 74.0 77 86.0
1975 71.5 76.0 79 88.0 107 Germany
2000 77.9 81.0 83 93.0 112
1950
1975 73.4 77.5 79 89.4 109 Spain
2000 79.1 82.6 87 93.4 110
1950 101
1975 71.9 75.5 78 88.4 107 Finland
2000 77.7 81.2 85 92.4 110
1950 66.4 73.0 78 86.7 107
1975 72.9 76.9 82 89.8 108 France
2000 78.5 82.3 87 93.9 122
1950 104
1975 72.6 76.0 81 88.0 108 Italy
2000 78.6 81.0 82 92.5 110
1950 71.1 75.6 80 87.5 105
1975 75.0 78.3 82 90.3 109 Sweden
2000 79.7 82.6 86 93.4 110
1950
1975 74.6 78.1 83 90.4 110 United
Kingdom
2000 77.9 81.8 84 90.6 115
(a)  Average number of years that an individual born in a particular year is expected to live.
(b) Age at which fifty per cent of the generation numbers born in a given year will remain alive
(c)  Age at which the maximum number of deaths of a generation born in a particular year would
occur (excluded infant mortality)
(d) Age at which ten per cent of the generation numbers born in a given year will remain alive
(e)  Highest age of the distribution of observed deaths in a given year
Sources: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed with data
from www.mortality.org.
Figure 2.19 shows Sweden and Spain to have the highest life expectancies at birth
(in 2000) and Denmark, Finland and the UK to have the lowest. Progress on that account
has been pronounced also during the eighties and nineties in most EU countries. Of course,
this development does not means that in the future life expectancies would augment as
rapidly as in the past, for as the absolute limit of a human life remains unchanged, one
should expect less and less margin to be left for further increases. Nevertheless, this
absolute limit is not well known yet and in any case were we to place it at around 120 years21
of age, there is still a considerable run before life expectancies show a clearly decelerating
pattern. Against this background can be discussed most of the longevity indicators whose
description follows.
Figure 2.9












Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed
with data from www.mortality.org.
In around 1950, a typical generation just born that year in western European
countries would have exhausted half its numbers at age 74 or, said differently, individuals
of that generation reaching their 74
th birthday would amount to half those born 74 years
before. This is known as “median duration” of a given generation. In 1975, the
corresponding age could be estimated as being about 3 years higher and still almost 4 years
higher in 2000 with respect to 25 years earlier. This can be seen for different EU countries
in Figure 2.10.
Again, these are theoretical estimates rather than observed ones for it is obvious we
cannot observe yet, given those estimates, at what effective age those born in any particular
country in 1950 would amount to half the numbers of 1950. All in all they show that
survival, as discussed before, is considerably improving at mature ages. Median duration,
on average, has been growing faster in the later decades than in the former in the last fifty
years almost everywhere with the marked exception of Denmark.22
Figure 2.10














Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed
with data from www.mortality.org.
Almost as marked seems to have been the evolution of a more demanding indicator
of generational duration which is “life endurance” where the survival limit is 10 per cent of
a given generation. The average age at which this limit is trespassed has risen from 87
years of age in 1950 to 89.5 in 1975 and again to 92.5 in 2000 on average for those
countries where data has been available to the AGIR teams. A further indication of (mildly)
accelerated compression at the high end of the survivors line. This can be seen in Figure
2.11, where the cases of Belgium and Germany, on the one hand, and Denmark, on the
other, stand at the extremes whereas France (reckon the ages involved) clearly shows a
considerable relative compression of its survival pattern.
Figure 2.11













Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed
with data from www.mortality.org.23
Also based on lifetables, the age at which most of the theoretical deaths (excluding
infant deaths) happen in a given generation, so called “modal duration” has been steadily
growing in the last decades. This can be seen in Figure 2.12 where the same pattern of
acceleration could be observed but for few exceptions. It has to be said that this age can be
very volatile as theoretical deaths are after all based on observed deaths whose numbers can
be affected by many different circumstances. Nevertheless, modal duration stood near 78
years of age in 1950, rose to slightly above 80 in 1975 and lies close to 85 years in 2000.
Figure 2.12










Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed
with data from www.mortality.org.
Coming now to observed deaths, a suggestive indicator, albeit fraught with
problems when it comes to actual value concerning average longevity, is the age of the
oldest person dead in any year. This is called “record age” and, of course, varies
enormously for only a handful of individuals, often just one, even in large countries,
happen to reach that very extreme. Record ages for EU countries are shown in Figure 2.13
either for 1950-2000 or 1975-2000 and can be seen to have grown everywhere. France
holds the record (in 1997) with Jeane Calment who died at 122. On average, record age has
increased from 104 years in 1950 (roughly the same as in 1900) to 108 in 1975 and 110 in
2002. The later figure, however, is biased downwards by the fact that available death
records in many countries collapse at age “110 or plus” thus biasing the whole average.
As said before, just a handful of individuals reach the highest age recorded at death
in every country, but the number of “centenarians” is increasing rapidly year after year in
every country. However, it would be simply wrong to infer from the above estimates of24
record ages that the limit age for a human being is actually increasing, let alone to provide
the answer to the million euro question: ¿What is the limit age for a human life?
Figure 2.13












Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed
with data from www.mortality.org.
All the previously discussed indicators of longevity can be put together as rough EU
averages for the period 1975-2000, as done in Figure 2.14. All in all, only progress in
longevity can be observed in the last fifty years in Europe. Indeed, while it seemed that the
dramatic developments of the century prior to 1950 had left a marrow margin for
improvements, gains have been happening nevertheless at an steady if not reinforced
rhythm.25
Figure 2.14






























































































































Life expectancy Median duration Modal duration
Life endurance Record age (Right scale)
Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices completed with data from
www.mortality.org.
3.  Lifecourses
One of the aims of the team in charge of gathering demographic data within the
AGIR project was to initiate the collection of data on what we have termed “lifecourses”
that is those landmarks in a typical life cycle that mark the passage from one state to
another, for instance, from school to the labour market, or from work to inactivity. One
can think of quite a large set of such landmarks and we have chosen those shown in Figure
3.1. Given the fact that we were not able to collect data for all countries and all years, it is
averages that are shown in the graph. These averages have been computed disregarding
those observations likely to distort the resulting figure.
Also, it has to be taken into account that we are not talking about true cohorts when
discussing about how different indicators relate to each other in any particular year. In fact,
the figures discussed at a particular moment in time refer to strictly different generations.
Those events happen to representative individuals of the concerned age that obviously do
not belong to the same generation. If at all we could see the whole set of landmarks shown
at any particular year as descriptive of a synthetic or theoretical generation.26
The story Figure 3.1 implies can be told as follows. Irrespective of gender,
Europeans have been since mid last century leaving school at higher ages, finding their first
job later and later, and thus leaving their parents home or getting married for the first time.
They have, correspondingly, had their first babies also at higher and higher ages of the
mothers (and fathers). So far, this means delayed entering into activity and household
formation.
Once in the labour force and effectively working, what we know from many sources
tells us that effective working periods have been far from been compact for many workers
across Europe, due to unemployment although we have not gathered data to document this.
Near retirement, invalidity and other pre-retirement events have increasingly prevented a
significant share of the working force to continue working while retirement through old-age
has shown a slightly declining trend around 60 years. Together with delayed entrance in the
labour market, unemployment, pre-retirement through invalidity or workforce adjustments
and declining old age retirement means increasingly reduced effective work spans for the
average worker in the last decades.
After retirement, well below the age of 60 if we reckon with the various causes so
far discussed that take workers definitely out of activity, individuals and household face a
totally different life span. Widowhood intervenes typically several years after retirement, at
younger ages for women than for men, and this event has had a dramatic development in
just few decades. Around 1980 Europeans widowed at around the age of 65 while at present
that age has increased to almost 70 years. On average also, life expectancy at 65 years
(both genders) has increased from 10 more years in 1950 to 18 more years of life at
present.27
Figure 3.1
























































































































































Leaving school First job Emancipation (Germany)
First marriage First child (women) Invalidity
Pre-retirement Inactivity Retirement
Widowhood HALE at 65 (+65) DALE at 65 (+65)
LE at 65 (+65) Emancipation (Spain)
Source: Own computations based on data from national Statistical Offices and EUROSTAT,
also completed with data from www.mortality.org.
However, that considerably enlarged post retirement span cannot be said to be free
of troubles for roughly the second half of it will be marked by some sort of health ailment
for the average individual as indicated by the “health adjusted life expectancies” or HALE
indicators that we have computed out of the European Community Household Panel.
Focusing on “disability adjusted life expectancy” or DALE, we find that, on average, even
if these impairments would typically subtract less years to the total remaining life span after
age 65 than general health troubles, the data available suggests an increased absolute
morbidity due to disability. We explain below how these adjusted measures of remaining28
life years are however fraught with problems arising from the health and disability surveys
themselves and other difficulties concerning their interpretation.
4.  Morbidity
As life expectancy has increased substantially over decades, there is a natural
interest in measuring life expectancy related to the health status of the population. A crucial
question is that as we live longer, in what state of health do we live? Measuring health
status of a population and comparing it with other populations has intrinsic interest as health
is one of the most important factors which determine human well-being. Besides, health has
important implications in broad areas of economics, from productivity, labor supply, health
care costs and the sustainability of public health systems. In this section we compute and
compare health status indicators and health adjusted life expectancies in European countries
using survey data.
4.1.  Data
One of the main harmonised data sources of self-assessed health status in Europe is
the European Community Household Panel survey (ECHP) which started in 1994 across 12
European countries. Sampling and survey questions are carefully prepared to assure
comparability across countries. A further advantage of the ECHP is that surveyed countries
share more or less similar culture and development levels as well as geographical
proximity. One of the questions included in the survey regarding health status is “How is
your health in general?” with possible responses, “very good”, “good”, “fair”, “bad” and
“very bad”. Other questions address chronic illness or disability, for instance: “Are you
hampered in your daily activities by any chronic physical or mental health problem?” with
possible responses, “yes, severely”, “yes, to some extent”, and “no”. We analyze the
responses to these two questions to compare health status and health-adjusted life
expectancy across European countries.29
We examine only the first wave (1994) of the survey to avoid the problem of
attrition.
4 First, it is useful to check the internal consistency of self-assessed health status by
examining the correlation between the two indices of health status that we will analyse. We
expect a strong correlation between general health status and disability status: those who
suffer from disability are likely to report worse health status. Indeed, as we can see in
Table 4.1 below, there exists a strong correlation between the two variables. The
proportion who suffer some degree of disability increases substantially as the declared
health status worsens: the disability proportion decreases from 92% to 83%, 41%, 8% and
to 3% as the declared health status moves from “very bad” to “bad”, “fair”, “good”, and
to “very good”. When we examine each country, we find the same pattern without
exception. This result is comforting as it provides some evidence for internal consistency at
least at individual level.
Table 4.1
Proportion with disability and annual medical consultation by health status
ECHP 1994
General Health Status
Very Bad Bad Fair Good Very Good Total
% with
Disability 91.79 83.43 40.66 8.35 2.59 22.23
# annual medical
consultation 8.54 7.55 5.28 3.14 2.34 3.91
# Observation 3166 9716 29,423 52,250 32,181 126,736
Another check of internal consistency is performed by examining the correlation
between health status and the use of health care services. Medical consultation frequencies
increase significantly as individuals’ health status worsen.
Another data source on health that we have available is national health surveys
carried out in various countries more or less regularly. Some advantages of the data from
national health surveys are that sometimes the sample size is large to provide precision in
health estimates of the population as well as permitting a higher level of dis-aggregation of
the data, that in some countries it is carried out regularly over time to allow us to examine
possible trend in health status of the population, and that national health surveys usually
                                          
4 Attrition problem is likely to be serious in the analysis of health status as health could be a cause of attrition.
Indeed, among the respondents aged 65 and more in the first wave of the ECHP, the proportion missing in the
second wave were 14.3%, 11,6%, 13.8%, 16.3% and 24.4% respectively corresponding to the first-wave
reported health status ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘fair’, ‘bad’ and ‘very bad’.30
include a wide variety of information concerning health status, self-assessed as well as
diagnosis based, the use of health care facilities, and health behaviour of the population.
Although a series of national health surveys are available to us within the AGIR project we
will not use those data in this paper. The results that follow would not be changed at all had
we used these other data.
4.2.  General Health Status
The general health status question is based entirely on respondents’ own perception.
The question asked is not concrete in terms of reference time period nor in the description
of each category of health status, therefore leaving a large room for interpretation
variability by interviewees. Second, the possible responses are ordered qualitatively.
Comparing the responses between groups of people is not straightforward.
We begin with simple “averages” of the responses after assigning a cardinal value
for each response (“very bad”=0, “bad”=1,..., “very good”=4). The simple average
provides a health index (the bigger the average, the better health) which is comparable
across the populations if we are willing to assume the linearity across responses. The
“average” health status by 5 years age interval for 11 European countries is presented in
Figure 4.1. Luxembourg is excluded for its small sample size.
Figure 4.1
Average Health Status: ECHP 94
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The first impression we receive from the figure is that self-assessed health status
gets worse with age by a similar gradient across countries. More importantly, there are
large differences in health status for given ages between the countries. For most age31
groups, Denmark and Ireland report best health status while Portugal, Italy and Spain
report worst health status. Peculiarly, Greece report best health among the young (less than
40) population but relatively worse health among the elderly (over 70) population. The
differences between countries are surprisingly large and the ranking is not completely
convincing as judged by other health measures, such as life expectancy.
5
Given that the comparison of “average” health status analysed above is valid only in
the case that the response categories can be  assigned with linearly aligned values, the index
loses substantive meaning in general. For the comparisons which suffer less of this
arbitrary assignment of values, we compare the proportions who report good or very good
health status as well as the proportions with bad or very bad health status.
Figure 4.2
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5 According to WHO (2000), life expectancy at birth is longest in France, Italy and Spain and shortest in Ireland,
Portugal and Denmark with the differences of about 2.5 years between the two groups.32
In the case of good or very good health, the proportion varies substantially between
countries even among the young population and the difference widens with age. The cross-
country differences are too large to accept as genuine differences. For example, the
proportion in good health among the population aged 65-69 is less than 20% in Portugal
while it is close to 60% in Ireland and Denmark. In the case of bad or very bad health, the
differences across countries are even larger among the middle and old age population. For
example, Ireland and The Netherlands have the proportion in bad or very bad health at
lower than 10% among the population aged 65-69, while the corresponding proportion is
higher than 30% in Portugal, Spain and Italy.
4.3.  Disability Status
The second question we analyse is disability status. In principle, we think that
disability status would suffer less from the cultural or social environment bias, as the
question is more concrete and less subjective. Given that the response categories are
“none”, “to some extent” and “severely”, we consider the proportion with severe or
moderate disability as well as that with only severe disability.
Figure 4.4





























































































The age profile of disability is as expected: older people suffer more often from
disability. Cross-country differences are somewhat smaller than in the case of general
health status. Nevertheless, the differences between countries are again substantial enough
to lead us to be reluctant in accepting them as genuine differences across countries. For
example, the proportion with some disability among the population aged 16-24 is less than
5 percent in Spain and Greece while it is higher than 12 percent in The Netherlands.
Among the population aged 55-59, as another example, the disability rate is less than 25%
in Ireland and Greece while it is almost 40% in Germany and Portugal. If we examine the
proportion with severe disability, the cross-country differences are proportionally larger,
especially among the elderly population. Here, France stands out for its high prevalence of
severe disability. For example, at ages 65 to 69, the severe disability rate is 22% in France
while that in UK, Ireland and Spain is only 10%. Moreover, the country ranking of
disability rate is widely different from that of general health status. A part of cross-country
differences at old ages may be due to the differences in the proportion of institutionalised
population which is not included in the ECHP.
One potential factor which might contribute to cross-country differences in the
perception of health status is the time (month) of year when the survey is carried out.
Indeed, there were considerable variations between countries in the month of year when the
surveys are carried out. It is possible that people enjoy different health status according to
the season due to seasonal variation of physical exercise. Mental health and mood may also
vary according to the season. To explore this possibility, we estimated individual health34
status (ordered logit regression for health status and logit regression for disability status)
including month and country dummies. The results indicate that month dummies are in
general not significant, therefore not a factor which can explain the observed cross-country
differences in self-assessed health status.
In summary, self-assessed general health status and disability status vary widely
across European countries. The differences are so large and often the country rankings
change across different measures or do not coincide with other health measures (such as life
expectancy) that we have to be careful in the interpretation of the cross-country differences
(Ahn, 2002).
4.4.  Health and education in the EU
Many studies have found a positive association between health and socioeconomic
status (income, wealth, education and occupation level, and employment status). However,
the direction of causation between them is difficult to establish, and is most likely that it
runs both way (see Bound, 1991; Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999 and the survey by Smith,
1999). For example, those with better health are likely to be more productive and enjoy
therefore greater earning potentials. On the other hand, greater wealth allows easier access
to and better quality of health care therefore providing better health outcome. It is also
possible that there are unobserved factors which affect both wealth and health in a same
direction, thus leading to the observed positive relation between the two. For example,
those who are far sighted are likely to take more care of their health and therefore more
productive and also save more, therefore leading to the observed positive association.
Education level suffers less from endogeneity problems than other socioeconomic
variables since most people complete their schooling relatively early (before age 25) when
their health status is in most cases good enough not to interfere with their schooling. For
example, as we could observe earlier, the proportion with bad or very bad health among
those aged less than 35 is less than 5% in all the ECHP countries. Many studies have
shown education as a single most important socioeconomic characteristics in determining
various measures of health (for example, Elo and Preston, 1996, in mortality and Freedman
and Martin, 1999, in function limitations).35
Education on General Health Status
We first examine the effect of education on general health status. In the following
Table 4.2 we present regression results of health status for the 11 European countries in
ECHP. Three schooling levels are distinguished, low (omitted category), medium and high.
Table 4.2
Effect of Education Level (relative to low education level) on Health Status
(ordered logit coefficients in parenthesis are not significant at 5% level)
Ages 25-44 Ages 45-64 Ages 65+
Medium High Medium High Medium High
Germany 0.176 0.508 0.292 0.757 0.385 0.421
Denmark 0.551 0.903 0.769 0.988 0.258 0.553
Netherlands 0.299 0.708 0.402 0.669 0.391 0.638
Belgium 0.269 0.644 0.371 0.600 (0.363) 0.618
France 0.304 0.405 0.355 0.613 0.322 0.588
UK 0.322 0.778 0.473 0.869 0.449 0.754
Ireland 0.675 0.904 0.485 0.991 0.759 1.145
Italy 0.342 0.672 0.444 0.610 0.548 1.008
Greece 0.172 0.300 0.597 0.832 0.433 1.062
Spain 0.365 0.599 0.824 1.145 1.038 0.817
Portugal 0.701 1.055 1.209 0.969 1.282 0.998
The results are encouraging. Among the 66 estimated coefficients, only one
(medium education level for ages 65+ in Belgium) is not significant at 5% level. We can
see persistently substantial effects of education on self-assessed health status across
countries and for all age groups, suggesting that there exist a genuine beneficial effects of
education in health. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that even when we include
other socioeconomic variables, such as employment status and household income, the
education coefficients maintain almost entirely their magnitude and statistical significance.
Education on Disability
Education again stands out as an important factor in determining the probability of
disability across countries and in all age groups. In most cases, education lowers
substantially the probability of suffering disability. This difference by education level is
greater among younger people than those over 64 years. Among those 65 or older, only
those with high education level enjoy significantly lower rates of disability, and this effect
of high education is greater among the Southern European countries than other countries
(Table 4.3).36
Table 4.3
Effect of Education Level (omitted: low) on Disability Status
(logit coefficients in parenthesis are not significant at 5% level)
25-44 45-64 65+
Medium High Medium High Medium High
Germany (0.045) -0.366 (-0.083) -0.447 (-0.101) (-0.142)
Denmark -0.848 -1.014 -0.675 -0.896 (-0.150) (-0.281)
Netherlands -0.281 -0.640 -0.341 -0.693 (-0.102) (-0.259)
Belgium -0.272 -0.952 -0.379 -0.386 (-0.193) -0.386
France -0.374 -0.900 -0.324 -1.169 -0.250 -0.512
UK -0.223 -0.607 -0.279 -0.542 (-0.145) -0.345
Ireland -0.824 -1.082 -0.632 -1.198 (-0.154) -0.933
Italy -0.390 -0.992 -0.629 -0.835 -0.285 -0.870
Greece -0.453 -0.518 -0.586 -0.996 (-0.187) -1.028
Spain -0.676 -1.222 -0.791 -1.441 -0.800 -0.677
Portugal -0.671 -0.730 -0.863 -0.524 -0.938 -0.498
Educational composition to explain cross-country health status differences
Given the persistent effect of education level on individual health status for all
countries analyzed, we may ask “Is it the differences in educational composition which
explain cross-country differences in health status?” Indeed, education level shows
substantial differences between the countries across the age groups. For example, the
proportion with the high level of education is close to 40% in Belgium and Denmark while
it is less than or close to 10% in Portugal and Italy among those aged 25 to 44. Similar
differences exist for other age groups as seen on Table 4.4
Table 4.4
Educational Composition : ECHP 94
Ages 25-44 Ages 45-64 Ages 65+
% medium % high % medium % high % medium % high
Belgium 34.98 39.14 27.49 26.65 22.57 13.42
Denmark 40.88 39.11 35.06 31.21 24.09 14.40
France 46.21 24.30 31.50 15.67 15.27 7.00
Germany 55.31 23.49 46.55 21.52 38.21 14.30
Greece 31.40 28.12 15.24 11.21 9.03 4.16
Ireland 42.40 16.63 27.36 10.80 12.89 5.63
Italy 42.63 10.12 20.78 6.34 13.17 3.80
Netherlands 63.10 21.39 56.58 18.07 43.61 9.91
Portugal 12.69 6.62 3.17 3.43 1.41 1.17
Spain 20.20 24.81 6.92 9.18 3.88 3.94
UK 38.61 26.11 27.85 19.98 18.49 10.7237
To contrast the hypothesis, we examine the health status by education level for three
age groups as defined earlier as shown in the following Figure 4.6a to 4.6c. If the
individuals in the same education category but in different countries show similar levels of
health status, cross-country health status differences could be attributed to the compositional
differences in education.
Figure 4.6a




























































The hypothesis can be rejected clearly. Education level affects significantly
individual health status in all countries as shown in the positive slope. However, education
profiles of health status are parallel between countries for most countries. Cross-country
health status variations at each level of education are much greater than the variations by
education within each country. Therefore, the differences in health status between countries
are attributed more to the country specific effects than to the educational composition.
5.  Health adjusted life expectancies. Trends and future scenarios.
5.1.  Concept and illustrations
What are Health Expectancies?
Health expectancies are summary measures of population health which refer to the
mean time (in years) that a person of given age can expect to live in a specific health state.
Health expectancy is a generic term used for any life expectancy lived in a specific health
state, which includes good health (i.e. disability free) or poor health (i.e. disabled).
Since the late eighties, an international group called “REVES” headed by J-M
Robine has developed and promoted the concepts and methodology for the calculation of
these indicators which are currently widely calculated and used by different countries for
the evaluation of population health status (Mathers et al., 1993). In a wider perspective, the39
World Health Organisation has published in recent years different indicators of health
expectancies (WHO, 2000; WHO, 2001 and WHO, 2002) for all member States.
When using health expectancies, the years lived are not equally considered
independently of the health state as it occurs when calculating life expectancy, but the
distinction is made between years lived in perfect health and years lived with some type of
health problem. Health expectancy indicators thus constitute an attractive instrument for the
long term follow-up of population health tendencies. They can be easily interpreted as an
extension of the life expectancy concept.
However, for them to be really useful, these indicators must be comparable among
populations and through time. This means, on one hand, to use homogenous concepts and
definitions of health and, on the other hand, to use comparable tools to obtain the
information about the population health status. Finally, several methods to calculate health
expectancies have been developed. A key issue in health expectancy calculation is the need
to define what is understood by health, in other words, under what criteria the health status
of a population is established. For all these reasons, it is not a surprise that there are as
many possible health expectancy measures as health concepts and methods to calculate them
(Robine et al., 1999).
Computing Health Expectancies
The most frequently used method for calculating health expectancy measures is
Sullivan’s method. It uses disability prevalence data or population health status data to
distinguish between hypothetical years of life lived with or without disability for a fictitious
cohort derived from a period mortality table. The main limitations of this methodology are:
Comparability between populations (can only be partially achieved using common
standardized models of protocols and questionnaires); the lack of information about the
transition or reversibility of different health states or disabilities; and that they offer stock
information, that is, accumulated results of the consequences of incidence of diseases and
injuries which did not necessarily occur at the same year that the survey took place.
The main advantages of Sullivan’s method lie in the simplicity of the calculations
and the relative easiness to obtain required information: it only requires a mortality table
and health state prevalence of the population which can be obtained easily from health or40
disability surveys. In some cases, data can even be obtained from some census
questionnaires.
Health Expectancies using the ECHP
As mentioned before, there is one statistical source common for all EU countries.
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a survey (conducted yearly since
1994) based on a standardised questionnaire that involves annual interviewing of a
representative panel of households and individuals in each country, covering a wide range
of topics. Main questions regarding health and disability in ECPH are related to self
perceived health and to disability. Although the questionnaire (questions and scale of
responses) is virtually the same in all countries, it became apparent from these surveys that
standardised instruments did not solve the problems of comparability across countries.
These problems relate much more fundamentally to unmeasured differences in expectations
and norms for health. Mathers (2003) and Sadana et al (2002) also highlight this problem.
After calculating Disability-Free Life expectancies (DFLE) in the UE countries (1994
wave, 12 countries) with the Sullivan method and life tables supplied by Eurostat, Robine et
al. (2001) evaluate the advantages of this source, but also point out some problems such as
different versions of questionnaire, different rate of response and the exclusion of
institutionalised population in the sample.
Based on the ECHP we have computed, following Sullivan’s method, a series of
illustrative disability adjusted life expectancy measures that are shown in Table 5.1 where
DFLE stands for Disability Free Life Expectancy, DLEm stands for Life Expectancy lived
in moderate disability and DLEs stands for Life Expectancy lived in severe disability.41
Table 5.1
Life Expectancy at birth and at age 65 Free of Disability,
with Moderate Disability and with Severe Disability
European Union. Year 1994. Both Sexes
At birth Women At birth Men
DFLE DLEm DLEs LE DFLE DLEm DLEs LE
France 64,6 8,2 9,1 81,9 Greece 63,0 7,5 4,7 75,2
Spain 63,5 12,0 5,9 81,4 Italy 60,4 9,5 4,6 74,6
Italy 61,1 13,0 6,9 81,0 The Netherlands 59,0 11,1 4,5 74,6
The Netherlands 58,9 15,3 6,2 80,3 Spain 61,8 8,2 4,2 74,2
Greece 65,0 9,5 5,7 80,2 United Kingdom 59,1 11,5 3,6 74,1
Belgium 61,4 12,9 5,8 80,1 France 60,1 6,7 6,9 73,8
Luxembourg 60,9 15,5 3,3 79,7 Belgium 60,3 9,0 4,1 73,4
Germany 60,0 14,1 5,5 79,6 Luxembourg 59,2 10,9 3,1 73,2
United Kingdom 60,8 13,8 4,7 79,3 Germany 56,7 11,5 5,0 73,1
Ireland 64,0 11,7 2,9 78,6 Ireland 61,2 9,2 2,6 73,0
Portugal 56,7 15,1 6,8 78,6 Denmark 60,7 8,9 3,1 72,7
Denmark 61,3 12,6 4,2 78,1 Portugal 55,0 11,0 5,6 71,6
Age 65 Women Age 65 Men
DFLE DLEm DLEs LE DFLE DLEm DLEs LE
France 10,3 4,4 5,9 20,6 France 8,9 3,0 4,3 16,2
Spain 9,1 6,4 4,3 19,8 Greece 8,7 4,4 3,1 16,1
Italy 7,7 6,7 5,0 19,4 Spain 9,0 4,7 2,3 16,0
Belgium 9,2 6,1 3,8 19,1 Italy 7,7 4,6 3,3 15,6
The Netherlands 8,6 6,5 4,0 19,1 Belgium 8,1 4,3 2,3 14,8
Luxembourg 10,4 6,6 1,7 18,7 The Netherlands 8,4 3,9 2,5 14,8
Germany 7,9 6,6 3,9 18,4 Germany 6,5 5,0 3,2 14,7
Greece 9,7 5,1 3,6 18,4 Luxembourg 9,5 3,8 1,3 14,6
United Kingdom 8,5 6,4 3,4 18,3 United Kingdom 7,6 4,8 2,2 14,6
Portugal 7,9 6,1 3,9 17,9 Portugal 7,1 4,3 3,0 14,4
Denmark 9,2 5,6 2,9 17,7 Denmark 8,9 3,6 1,9 14,3
Ireland 9,8 6,0 1,5 17,3 Ireland 8,2 4,1 1,5 13,8
Source: Eurostat. European Community Household Panel.
According to 1994 ECHP wave, Greece is the population with a highest level of
DFLE at birth (measured in years of life lived without disability, both for men and women.
The worst figures belong to Portugal. At ages 65, Italy (men) and Germany (women) have
the worst situation, and France and Luxembourg the best one. As a proportion of total life
expectancy, the ranking is not exactly the same (because the differences in LE is not always
the same as of the DFLE), but quite similar: Portugal, Italy, Germany and The Netherlands
in the group with low proportions, and Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark in the
group with high proportions.
ECHP database also permits to calculate DFLE by level of severity. The years lived
with disability are discomposed between ‘moderate disability’ and ‘severe disability’. For
all countries except France, a higher proportion of disability belongs to ‘moderate
disability’. For the elderly population, the proportion of severe disability tends to increase,
and often becomes a dominating proportion of disability years in the last open-age interval.42
5.2.  Data
Health Data
European Community Household Panel (ECPH) surveys provide health data from
1994 to 1998 for 11 countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France,
Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom.
There are some problems in the use of this Survey for cross-country comparison
purposes, and even to compare the results for a country in different years. These questions are
extensively discussed in the previous section, and they will not be commented here. With
these problems in mind, we try to describe here the main tendencies found in the period
1994-1998.
The health related items from the ECPH questionnaire are:
a)  Self-assessed health status. How is your health in general? (very
good/good/fair/bad/very bad)
b)  Disability. “Are you hampered in your daily activities by any chronic,
physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?” (Yes, severely/Yes,
to some extent/No)
Four types of health status have been estimated using these questions:
a)  Good health (= very good + good)
b)  Bad health (= bad + very bad)
c)  Disability (any level) (= Yes, severely +Yes, to some extent)
d)  Severe disability (= Yes, severely)
Health and Disability prevalence age groups range from 16 to 85+ years old. Prevalence
for the first age group, 16-19, have been applied to the 15-19 population group, in order to get
a HE at age 15. No HE at younger ages (0-14) have been estimated.
Mortality Data
We have used the Eurostat life tables for the EU countries available at Eurostat New
Cronos Data Base. This is a unique common source available, thus it guarantees no
methodological biases in the mortality basis of computation of HE. Death probabilities –
q(x)- and life expectancies –e(x)- at each age are the only LT series available in the New
Cronos DATA BASE. We have calculated other data (survivors at each age –l(x)-,43
stationary population –L(x)-) which are necessary for the application of Sullivan method of
health expectancy.
However, mortality information is not available for all countries neither for all
years. For year 1998 it is available only for France and Spain, and for Italy no mortality
data is available for 1996-98. In order to fill this hole we have calculated respective LT
using the information on deaths by sex and age, and population by sex and age available in
Eurostat New Cronos DATA BASE. We have used the actuarial method of construction of
LT (regular distribution of deaths between exact ages, except for the first age, to which we
have applied a fixed ratio equal to 0,15-0,85). We were not able to know the precise
methodology used by Eurostat to construct its LT. For this reason, our LT are a very fine
replication of them, but not an exact reproduction. Anyway, differences are negligible and
do not affect the HE calculations.
5.3.  Trends in Health Expectancies 1994-1998
Data in the ECHP allows us thus to compute the basic Health Expectancy indicators
for EU countries. This is what we do in this section through four different indicators for
men and women and at age 65, that is, LEGH or Life Expectancy in Good Health, LEBH
or Life Expectancy in Bad Health, DFLE or Disability Free Life Expectancy and SDFLE
or Severe-Disability Free Life Expectancy. As explained before when discussing health
status for EU countries, comparisons among countries are not straightforward due to
several factors. On the other hand, for any given country, comparison of results through
time are equally flawed due to attrition, among other causes.
Life Expectancy in Good Health (LEGH).
As shown in Table 5.2, the values of LEGH vary considerably between countries.
We can organize them in three groups, including: UK, IRE, NET, DEN and BEL have
highest values of LEGH; GRE, SPA and FRA are among the middle group; and ITA, GER
and POR have the lowest LEGH. These groups remain the same both for males and
females.
For men, expected years of life in good health have clearly increased during the
studied period in Ireland, Greece and Spain. On the other hand, an evident decrease has44
been observed in France and Portugal. The other countries (BEL, DEN, GER, ITA, UK)
show an erratic pattern, with no clear trends during the 1994-1998 period.
For women, the pattern is slightly different from the case of men. A clear increase
is shown for Spain, Belgium and Ireland, while for Portugal and France a clear decrease
has been observed. For the rest of the countries no clear patterns are observed.
Table 5.2
Life Expectancy in Good health – LEGH (remaining years in good health after age 65)
Males Females
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
B 7,81 7,23 7,55 7,94 7,56 7,45 7,69 7,69 7,93 8,31
D 3,38 3,52 2,98 3,32 3,22 3,12 3,25 2,92 2,67 3,25
DK 7,87 8,21 8,20 8,11 7,84 8,36 8,11 8,27 8,36 8,64
E 4,89 5,65 5,65 5,77 5,80 4,50 5,06 5,13 5,20 5,25
F 5,74 5,16 5,35 5,11 4,98 5,77 5,09 5,26 5,52 5,03
GR 5,12 5,35 6,00 5,96 6,51 4,73 4,73 5,58 4,60 5,52
I 3,64 3,54 3,64 3,79 3,50 3,34 3,57 3,21 3,68 3,31
IRL 7,45 7,44 8,30 8,51 8,29 8,10 8,59 8,34 9,55 9,51
NL 7,55 7,78 7,36 7,91 8,29 8,44 8,38 8,12 8,46 8,11
P 2,67 2,40 2,04 1,92 1,68 2,01 1,62 1,34 1,08 1,01
UK 8,99 9,15 9,59 9,25 8,83 8,74 8,51 9,04 8,67 9,83
Source: EUROSTAT-ECHP and own computations
Life Expectancy in Bad Health (LEBH).
Trends in LEBH are shown in Table 5.3 below and are, in general, symmetric to the
good health ones (as the former increases, the latter decreases). But there are some
exceptions because the middle category (‘fair’) is not included in either of them. The
population share of ‘fair’ health has varied across the countries and over time.
Both the number of years lived in bad health and its proportion over the total life
expectancy are in general greater among females than among males.
The longest time in bad health for male population is found in Portugal and Italy,
while the shortest time in bad health is observed in the UK, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland and
the Netherlands. For the female population the grouping is not so clear.
Time trends for male LEBH show a pair of countries with increasing years lived in
bad health (Portugal and France); two countries with a clear and strong decrease (Ireland
and Spain); Italy with a slight decrease; and the rest of countries with an erratic or unstable
pattern.45
On the other hand, time trends for female LEBH show increasing values in Portugal
and the UK, a clear decrease in Spain, Greece and Ireland, a certain decrease in Denmark
and Belgium, and an absence of any pattern in Italy, the Netherlands and France.
Table 5.3
Life Expectancy in Bad health – LEBH (remaining years in bad health after age 65)
Males Females
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
B 1,61 1,52 1,56 1,73 1,64 3,49 2,93 3,11 2,91 2,98
D 4,82 5,07 4,78 4,55 4,79 6,34 6,53 6,54 6,38 7,60
DK 1,98 1,57 2,20 1,73 2,03 3,55 3,36 4,18 3,75 2,91
E 5,06 4,81 4,31 4,44 4,31 8,19 7,86 6,89 7,14 7,03
F 2,82 2,67 2,79 3,02 3,28 4,50 4,79 4,08 4,41 4,55
GR 5,04 4,42 3,65 4,30 4,05 6,66 5,09 5,33 5,44 5,06
I 5,60 5,45 5,41 5,49 5,35 8,20 8,26 7,96 8,20 8,40
Irl 1,53 1,28 1,10 0,98 0,81 2,47 1,99 1,95 2,38 1,73
NL 1,48 1,17 1,19 1,23 0,93 2,01 2,37 2,24 2,28 2,14
P 6,58 6,42 6,97 7,10 6,87 9,74 9,75 10,57 10,64 10,63
UK 2,02 1,73 1,46 1,80 2,06 2,08 2,38 2,31 2,54 3,16
Source: EUROSTAT-ECHP and own computations
Disability Free Life Expectancy (DFLE).
Globally speaking, cross-country differences in DFLE are smaller than in the case
of LEGH or LEBH, with the exception of two countries: the UK, with a higher level
relative to other countries, and Germany clearly below the level of others. This can be seen
in Table 5.4 below.
Most of the countries show an increase of DFLE. But it seems that a certain
problem exists with the data for 1994. Both for males and females, values in 1994 are
substantially smaller than for the rest of years. Only France has the opposite situation. We
must remember there was a slight change in the questionnaire from 1995; in 1994 there was
only one question regarding disability, while from 1995 the same question is divided into
two, the existence of disability and the severity.
During the five year period observed in ECHP surveys, DFLE tends to increase in
most of the countries except for France. But if we don’t take into account the year 1994,
trends in DFLE become more complex. Both for males and females, an increase in DFLE
is observed in Spain, Greece, Ireland and Italy, while a decrease is observed in Denmark,
Belgium, the UK, Portugal and France.46
Table 5.4
Disability Free Life Expectancy – DFLE (remaining years free of disability after age 65)
Males Females
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
B 8,03 9,98 9,71 10,76 8,97 9,01 11,95 12,45 12,42 10,34
D 4,17 4,59 4,75 4,35 6,91 7,34 7,08 5,14
DK 9,03 9,41 8,83 9,04 9,05 9,12 9,33 9,41 8,91 9,82
E 9,08 9,94 10,58 10,57 10,32 9,21 11,24 11,08 11,42 11,42
F 8,89 7,53 7,38 7,72 7,17 10,28 8,24 8,55 8,99 8,91
GR 8,75 9,83 10,34 9,96 10,15 9,82 11,55 11,82 11,20 11,42
I 7,41 10,21 10,12 10,68 10,50 7,31 11,51 11,91 12,17 11,95
Irl 7,89 9,03 9,59 9,16 9,86 9,37 10,62 10,40 10,56 11,32
NL 8,46 9,33 9,39 9,25 9,20 8,67 10,59 10,58 10,78 10,27
P 7,36 8,28 7,41 8,00 7,83 8,06 9,98 8,45 8,81 8,60
UK 10,61 11,48 11,49 11,34 10,99 12,99 13,60 13,91 13,54 12,48
Source: EUROSTAT-ECHP and own computations
Severe-Disability Free Life Expectancy (SDFLE).
Table 5.5 shows how SDFLE has in general more erratic trends than DFLE.
According to ECPH, Spain is the country with the most years free of severe disability after
age 65 during the whole period (1994-98) and both for males and females. On the other
hand, the UK, Portugal and Germany have the least years free of severe disability at age 65
of all countries.
Table 5.5
Severe Disability Free Life Expectancy - SDFLE
(remaining years free of severe disability after age 65)
Males Females
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
B 12,51 12,75 12,52 13,32 10,99 15,06 15,17 15,20 15,92 13,32
D 10,87 11,30 12,30 11,42 14,34 14,35 14,88 13,58
DK 12,54 12,26 12,09 12,62 12,51 14,62 14,17 13,96 14,03 14,56
E 13,66 13,44 13,80 13,97 13,75 15,47 15,70 16,39 16,46 16,13
F 11,94 11,67 11,69 11,61 11,82 14,62 14,27 14,81 14,46 14,37
GR 13,12 12,83 13,60 13,47 13,08 14,88 15,03 15,26 15,20 14,95
I 12,25 12,85 13,38 13,54 13,41 13,99 14,62 16,06 15,87 15,90
Irl 12,12 11,88 12,69 12,62 12,96 14,85 14,88 14,99 15,08 16,22
NL 12,34 12,78 12,36 12,86 12,50 15,17 15,43 15,51 15,57 15,35
P 11,37 11,37 10,69 10,85 11,10 13,95 13,90 13,15 13,17 12,97
UK 10,61 11,48 11,49 11,34 10,99 12,99 13,60 13,91 13,54 12,48
Source: EUROSTAT-ECHP and own computations47
Summing up
Globally speaking, we find a great divergence of trends between countries and few
clear trends. However, we may distinguish certain groups of countries. Spain, Ireland,
Greece and Italy seem to improve their health (increase of DFLE and LEGH, decrease of
LEBH), while Portugal and France show a deteriorating trend in their health. We don’t
know if this is a genuine picture of the health status of the EU population, or the results of
other factors such as culture, social norm and measurement errors imbedded in health data.
We think it is difficult under this circumstance to establish any coherent set of hypothesis
for projections of health status based on past trends.
5.4.  How HE relates to LE?
In this section we examine the relationship between life expectancy and health
expectancy for the years 1994-1998 for which we have data for health status (ECHP). The
purpose of this exercise is to see if there is any consistent and reasonable relationship
between the two which can be used for the projection of health expectancies. Life
expectancy data for the years 1994 to 1998 are obtained from Eurostat New Cronos data
base. Health expectancies for each year are computed combining the life expectancy and
health prevalence data from ECHP by Sullivan method. We computed the HE at age 15.
We compare life expectancy with several measures of health expectancy, in good health,
disability free, and severe-disability free. For each comparison, we have 55 data points (11
countries for 5 years, 1994-1998).
Life expectancy in good health vs. LE
As shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, there is a big dispersion of the observations
without any particular pattern, and most linear regression lines are insignificant.
Furthermore, the correlation coefficients are small and insignificant. If we interpret literally
the regression results, a one year increase in LE for men at age 15 increase LE in good
health by 2 year, while it decreases the LE in good health for women by one year.48
Figure 5.1
  MALES 15 LEGH / LE 
y = 1,971x - 76,58 
R 


















FEMALES 15 LEGH / LE

















Disability Free Life expectancy vs. LE
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show again that there is also a big dispersion of the
observations. For the case of men, the regression line is relatively significant with a
coefficient close to 2, suggesting that one year increase in LE increases disability free life
expectancy by 2 years. For women it is close to zero, suggesting that disability free life
expectancy is irrelevant to the changes in life expectancy.49
Figure 5.3
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Severe-Disability Free Life expectancy vs. LE
Once more. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 tell us that there is a big dispersion of the
observations without any consistent relationship behind also in what concerns our measure
of SDFL and life expectancy.
Figure 5.5
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The analysis above analysis clearly suggests that we can not rely on the observed
relationship between LE and HE for the purpose of projecting health expectancies
5.5.  Conventional scenarios for Health Adjusted Life Expectancy
Given the absence of sensible patterns among Health Expectancies and Life
Expectancies out of the ECHP data, a simple but consistent procedure is used to create
Health Expectancy scenarios for EU countries. We define three indicators of health
expectancy: in good health, disability free, and severe-disability free. Computations are
made at ages 15 and 65.
With respect to trend in health status in the future, we explore two variants. The
first one assumes that the proportion of HE over LE stays constant at the average level of
the period 1994-1998. This we call also “constant relative morbidity” hypothesis. The
second one assumes that the years in an unhealthy state (not in good health or with
disability) remain constant at the average level of the period 1994-1998 or “constant
absolute morbidity” hypothesis.
The first assumption implies that any indicator of health expectancy either for men
or women, at age 15 or 65, increases in the same proportion as life expectancy for any
gender and age, thus keeping constant the ratio between HE and LE. The second
assumption implies that HE increases by the same number of years as LE does, thus
implying that any gain in life years is free of health and disability problems.
These two scenarios, that we would not call projections, respectively, would likely
capture the lower and upper trends one could expect concerning future advances in healthy
life expectancies. The results for EU countries present in the ECHP (except Luxembourg)51
are shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, where estimates for 1996 have been obtained out of
observed data whereas estimates for the projections for 2010 and 2025. As such these
scenarios keep on average the country differences in health adjusted life expectancies
observed in the nineties (1994-1998).52
Table 5.6
Scenarios for Health Expectancies. Constant relative morbidity hypothesis
Females Age 15 Females Age 65
LE 15 F LEGH 15 F DFLE 15 F DFLES 15 F LE 65 F LEGH 65 F DFLE 65 F DFLES 65F
1996 66,03 43,77 54,77 60,65 19,26 7,69 12,45 15,20
BEL 2010 68,25 46,15 54,55 62,03 20,52 9,11 12,53 16,23
2025 69,80 47,70 56,10 63,58 21,64 10,23 13,65 17,35
1996 63,80 45,90 47,24 58,60 17,80 8,27 9,41 13,96
DEN 2010 65,56 47,79 48,31 59,96 19,04 9,58 10,55 15,50
2025 67,09 49,33 49,85 61,50 20,07 10,60 11,57 16,52
1996 65,42 27,88 39,29 58,52 18,59 2,92 7,34 14,35
GER 2010 67,81 30,78 40,99 60,90 20,12 4,49 8,07 15,74
2025 69,35 32,32 42,53 62,44 21,26 5,63 9,20 16,87
1996 66,14 47,28 55,77 61,61 18,59 5,58 11,82 15,26
GRE 2010 68,09 47,74 56,29 63,02 20,02 6,46 12,59 16,49
2025 69,59 49,25 57,79 64,52 21,16 7,60 13,73 17,63
1996 67,26 40,39 53,79 62,46 19,91 5,13 11,08 16,39
SPA 2010 68,97 41,28 54,52 63,62 21,04 6,15 11,99 17,15
2025 70,10 42,41 55,65 64,75 21,86 6,96 12,81 17,96
1996 67,52 35,97 48,57 59,24 20,66 5,26 8,55 14,81
FRA 2010 69,75 38,35 51,28 60,89 22,04 6,67 10,33 15,84
2025 71,34 39,94 52,87 62,48 23,15 7,78 11,45 16,96
1996 64,22 49,04 52,84 61,01 17,31 8,34 10,40 14,99
IRE 2010 66,52 51,55 54,53 63,49 19,07 10,49 12,13 16,87
2025 68,27 53,30 56,27 65,23 20,34 11,76 13,40 18,14
1996 67,15 34,75 55,92 62,48 19,87 3,21 11,91 16,06
ITA 2010 69,05 36,70 56,18 63,42 21,06 4,73 12,27 16,59
2025 70,51 38,16 57,63 64,88 22,17 5,83 13,38 17,70
1996 65,92 44,61 48,43 59,59 19,03 8,12 10,58 15,51
NET 2010 67,57 46,02 49,45 61,29 20,14 9,34 11,22 16,45
2025 69,11 47,55 50,99 62,83 21,25 10,45 12,33 17,56
1996 64,38 27,53 47,31 57,06 17,67 1,34 8,45 13,15
POR 2010 66,39 29,41 49,35 59,30 18,78 2,37 9,74 14,39
2025 68,19 31,21 51,14 61,10 20,05 3,65 11,01 15,66
1996 65,04 42,26 56,08 18,32 9,04 13,91
UK 2010 67,18 44,84 57,57 19,70 10,32 14,67
2025 69,06 46,71 59,44 21,10 11,72 16,06
Males Age 15 Males Age 65
LE 15M LEGH 15M DFLE 15M DFLES 15M LE 65M LEGH 65M DFLE 65M DFLES 65M
1996 59,48 45,34 50,63 55,71 14,96 7,55 9,71 12,52
BEL 2010 62,76 48,42 52,80 58,58 16,78 9,42 11,29 14,22
2025 64,79 50,45 54,83 60,61 18,10 10,73 12,61 15,53
1996 58,72 46,49 48,14 55,33 14,35 8,20 8,83 12,09
DEN 2010 61,53 49,39 50,70 58,50 15,95 9,56 10,59 13,92
2025 63,43 51,30 52,61 60,41 17,18 10,80 11,82 15,16
1996 59,17 29,41 37,77 53,71 14,87 2,98 4,59 11,30
GER 2010 62,21 33,40 40,77 56,88 16,57 4,92 6,11 13,11
2025 64,20 35,39 42,76 58,87 17,87 6,23 7,41 14,41
1996 60,95 47,49 52,83 57,20 16,15 6,00 10,34 13,60
GRE 2010 63,48 49,14 54,12 59,24 17,53 7,08 11,10 14,51
2025 65,39 51,04 56,03 61,15 18,82 8,36 12,38 15,80
1996 60,14 41,01 51,00 56,59 16,08 5,65 10,58 13,80
SPA 2010 61,70 41,97 51,74 57,82 16,82 6,29 10,83 14,46
2025 63,27 43,54 53,30 59,39 17,77 7,24 11,79 15,41
1996 59,73 37,18 45,74 53,35 16,12 5,35 7,38 11,69
FRA 2010 62,43 39,74 48,56 55,84 17,65 6,71 9,18 13,19
2025 64,44 41,75 50,57 57,84 18,84 7,90 10,37 14,38
1996 58,90 47,85 50,33 56,75 13,83 8,30 9,59 12,69
IRE 2010 61,44 50,20 51,89 58,99 15,36 9,48 10,59 13,94
2025 63,36 52,12 53,81 60,91 16,67 10,79 11,89 15,24
1996 60,77 37,02 52,59 57,78 15,71 3,64 10,12 13,38
ITA 2010 63,20 39,35 53,98 59,65 17,30 5,18 11,34 14,64
2025 65,24 41,39 56,02 61,69 18,66 6,53 12,69 15,99
1996 60,34 45,45 48,38 56,18 14,75 7,36 9,39 12,36
NET 2010 62,59 47,92 49,94 58,45 16,23 9,14 10,49 13,94
2025 64,31 49,64 51,66 60,17 17,43 10,34 11,69 15,13
1996 57,06 31,13 44,88 51,58 14,19 2,04 7,41 10,69
POR 2010 59,76 33,28 47,30 54,22 15,25 3,01 8,64 11,94
2025 61,97 35,50 49,52 56,44 16,55 4,30 9,93 13,23
1996 60,03 43,62 52,74 14,85 9,59 11,49
UK 2010 62,59 45,94 54,93 16,26 10,56 12,58
2025 64,45 47,79 56,79 17,54 11,84 13,87
  Source: Own computations53
Table 5.7
Scenarios for Health Expectancies. Constant absolute  morbidity hypothesis
Females Age 15 Females Age 65
LE 15 F LEGH 15 F DFLE 15 F DFLES 15 F LE 65 F LEGH 65 F DFLE 65 F DFLES 65F
1996 66,03 43,77 54,77 60,65 19,26 7,69 12,45 15,20
BEL 2010 68,25 45,38 54,07 61,81 20,52 8,34 11,99 15,94
2025 69,80 46,41 55,30 63,21 21,64 8,80 12,65 16,81
1996 63,80 45,90 47,24 58,60 17,80 8,27 9,41 13,96
DEN 2010 65,56 47,45 47,99 59,85 19,04 8,93 9,96 15,25
2025 67,09 48,57 49,11 61,26 20,07 9,41 10,50 16,08
1996 65,42 27,88 39,29 58,52 18,59 2,92 7,34 14,35
GER 2010 67,81 29,49 40,05 60,66 20,12 3,28 7,13 15,40
2025 69,35 30,16 40,96 62,04 21,26 3,47 7,53 16,27
1996 66,14 47,28 55,77 61,61 18,59 5,58 11,82 15,26
GRE 2010 68,09 47,15 55,95 62,87 20,02 5,42 12,02 16,22
2025 69,59 48,19 57,18 64,26 21,16 5,73 12,70 17,15
1996 67,26 40,39 53,79 62,46 19,91 5,13 11,08 16,39
SPA 2010 68,97 40,60 54,16 63,49 21,04 5,31 11,49 16,93
2025 70,10 41,27 55,05 64,53 21,86 5,52 11,93 17,58
1996 67,52 35,97 48,57 59,24 20,66 5,26 8,55 14,81
FRA 2010 69,75 37,34 50,69 60,61 22,04 5,68 9,57 15,44
2025 71,34 38,19 51,84 61,99 23,15 5,97 10,06 16,23
1996 64,22 49,04 52,84 61,01 17,31 8,34 10,40 14,99
IRE 2010 66,52 51,01 54,09 63,38 19,07 9,66 11,46 16,66
2025 68,27 52,35 55,51 65,04 20,34 10,31 12,22 17,77
1996 67,15 34,75 55,92 62,48 19,87 3,21 11,91 16,06
ITA 2010 69,05 35,75 55,80 63,26 21,06 3,65 11,69 16,30
2025 70,51 36,50 56,97 64,59 22,17 3,84 12,31 17,15
1996 65,92 44,61 48,43 59,59 19,03 8,12 10,58 15,51
NET 2010 67,57 45,49 49,01 61,14 20,14 8,75 10,73 16,25
2025 69,11 46,53 50,13 62,53 21,25 9,24 11,32 17,14
1996 64,38 27,53 47,31 57,06 17,67 1,34 8,45 13,15
POR 2010 66,39 28,35 48,86 59,10 18,78 1,49 9,25 14,15
2025 68,19 29,12 50,18 60,70 20,05 1,59 9,88 15,11
1996 65,04 42,26 56,08 18,32 9,04 13,91
UK 2010 67,18 44,11 57,25 19,70 9,62 14,29
2025 69,06 45,34 58,85 21,10 10,31 15,30
Males Age 15 Males Age 65
LE 15M LEGH 15M DFLE 15M DFLES 15M LE 65M LEGH 65M DFLE 65M DFLES 65M
1996 59,48 45,34 50,63 55,71 14,96 7,55 9,71 12,52
BEL 2010 62,76 47,63 52,25 58,35 16,78 8,53 10,63 13,91
2025 64,79 49,17 53,94 60,24 18,10 9,20 11,46 15,00
1996 58,72 46,49 48,14 55,33 14,35 8,20 8,83 12,09
DEN 2010 61,53 48,83 50,20 58,36 15,95 8,89 10,03 13,71
2025 63,43 50,34 51,76 60,17 17,18 9,58 10,80 14,77
1996 59,17 29,41 37,77 53,71 14,87 2,98 4,59 11,30
GER 2010 62,21 31,97 39,71 56,61 16,57 3,64 4,95 12,73
2025 64,20 32,99 40,98 58,43 17,87 3,93 5,34 13,73
1996 60,95 47,49 52,83 57,20 16,15 6,00 10,34 13,60
GRE 2010 63,48 48,57 53,76 59,07 17,53 6,25 10,59 14,27
2025 65,39 50,03 55,37 60,85 18,82 6,71 11,36 15,32
1996 60,14 41,01 51,00 56,59 16,08 5,65 10,58 13,80
SPA 2010 61,70 41,51 51,50 57,73 16,82 5,81 10,56 14,35
2025 63,27 42,57 52,81 59,20 17,77 6,14 11,16 15,16
1996 59,73 37,18 45,74 53,35 16,12 5,35 7,38 11,69
FRA 2010 62,43 38,75 47,96 55,55 17,65 5,74 8,42 12,79
2025 64,44 40,00 49,50 57,33 18,84 6,12 8,99 13,65
1996 58,90 47,85 50,33 56,75 13,83 8,30 9,59 12,69
IRE 2010 61,44 49,71 51,47 58,88 15,36 8,85 10,08 13,79
2025 63,36 51,26 53,07 60,72 16,67 9,61 10,94 14,96
1996 60,77 37,02 52,59 57,78 15,71 3,64 10,12 13,38
ITA 2010 63,20 38,41 53,62 59,51 17,30 3,98 10,75 14,38
2025 65,24 39,65 55,35 61,43 18,66 4,29 11,59 15,50
1996 60,34 45,45 48,38 56,18 14,75 7,36 9,39 12,36
NET 2010 62,59 47,41 49,50 58,31 16,23 8,49 9,96 13,72
2025 64,31 48,72 50,86 59,91 17,43 9,12 10,70 14,74
1996 57,06 31,13 44,88 51,58 14,19 2,04 7,41 10,69
POR 2010 59,76 32,22 46,80 54,00 15,25 2,27 8,24 11,74
2025 61,97 33,41 48,54 56,00 16,55 2,46 8,94 12,74
1996 60,03 43,62 52,74 14,85 9,59 11,49
UK 2010 62,59 45,24 54,61 16,26 10,02 12,23
2025 64,45 46,58 56,23 17,54 10,82 13,20
  Source: Own computations54
5.6.  Education: The key to better future health status of population
The previous exercise of building HE scenarios based on rather crude hypotheses,
avoided the shortcomings that using observed trends would have otherwise caused. But
even if limiting the extent of our ignorance on this matter it is still unsatisfactory. In order
to exploit further the information contained in the ECHP to advance in this direction, we
recall the analysis previously made on education and health as a very convenient way to
establish some estimates about the composition effects of a more educated population on
future health status of EU members’ populations
As better educated younger generations replace older generations with lower levels
of education, health status of the population would improve in the future. The magnitude of
the improvement will depend on the differences in education levels between generations and
the differences in health status by education levels.
Given that most people’s education levels do not change after age 30, we can project
the educational composition of the future population for those who are currently 30 years or
older. Assuming that the mortality rate is the same regardless of education level, the
educational composition of the population in age X ten years from now will be the same as
that of the population in age X-10 now. Multiplying the health status by age and education
with the age-education distribution of the future population, we obtain the projection of
health status of future population. We examine the future health status of three age groups,
55-64, 65-74 and 75-84. Assuming that the age-education specific health status remains at
the level observed in ECHP 1994, we examine the health status of the three age groups in
2004 and 2014.
As seen on Table 5.8, the potential health improvement due to educational
composition is most among the 55-64 age group and least among the 75-84 age group
irrespective of the country considered. There are also substantial variations between
countries. With respect to the proportion in good health, among the population aged 55-64
it increases by 8 and 9 percentage points in Spain and Greece during the period 1994-2014
while it increases by only one percentage points in Belgium and the Netherlands. For the
age group 65-74, the improvement is most (5 percentage points) in Denmark while it is
least (1 percentage point) in Portugal. Among those aged 75-84, the improvement is
relative small.55
Table5.8
Proportion in Good Health in 1994 (observed), 2004 and 2014 (projected) in the EU
Ages 55-64 Ages 65-75 Ages 75-84
1994 2004 2014 1994 2004 2014 1994 2004 2014
Denmark 0,648 0,683 0,698 0,549 0,572 0,599 0,455 0,472 0,490
Netherland
s 0,607 0,623 0,633 0,501 0,515 0,524 0,444 0,454 0,463
Belgium 0,598 0,624 0,634 0,486 0,497 0,526 0,374 0,378 0,389
France 0,479 0,517 0,529 0,374 0,386 0,415 0,257 0,264 0,278
UK 0,617 0,642 0,659 0,506 0,520 0,540 0,435 0,442 0,457
Ireland 0,701 0,713 0,728 0,562 0,591 0,607 0,430 0,436 0,458
Italy 0,387 0,405 0,430 0,268 0,272 0,293 0,210 0,211 0,213
Greece 0,542 0,583 0,633 0,364 0,372 0,400 0,208 0,211 0,219
Spain 0,385 0,410 0,464 0,301 0,308 0,328 0,215 0,220 0,224
Portugal 0,298 0,310 0,326 0,165 0,166 0,174 0,125 0,130 0,131
Source: EUROSTAT-ECHP and own computations
Similar cross-country differences can be observed in the proportion with disability;
Spain and Greece improve most among the population group 55-64, Belgium and France
for the 65-75 age group, and Denmark for the oldest age group as shown in Table 5.9.
Table5.9
Proportion with Disability in 1994 (observed), 2004 and 2014 (projected) in the EU
Ages 55-64 Ages 65-75 Ages 75-84
1994 2004 2014 1994 2004 2014 1994 2004 2014
Denmark 0,315 0,285 0,271 0,377 0,366 0,354 0,460 0,437 0,425
Netherland
s 0,373 0,363 0,356 0,440 0,432 0,426 0,519 0,511 0,503
Belgium 0,344 0,335 0,329 0,421 0,414 0,396 0,614 0,614 0,612
France 0,281 0,255 0,249 0,389 0,378 0,350 0,537 0,534 0,528
UK 0,335 0,325 0,318 0,449 0,444 0,438 0,520 0,518 0,512
Ireland 0,260 0,248 0,231 0,392 0,383 0,376 0,493 0,490 0,478
Italy 0,322 0,304 0,280 0,444 0,441 0,427 0,580 0,584 0,581
Greece 0,289 0,266 0,238 0,375 0,368 0,350 0,532 0,533 0,526
Spain 0,366 0,350 0,315 0,403 0,398 0,383 0,557 0,554 0,552
Portugal 0,423 0,413 0,401 0,489 0,488 0,478 0,563 0,561 0,561
Source: EUROSTAT-ECHP and own computations
These results clearly point out to a general improvement of the proportion of life
years lived in either good health or free of disability beyond the doubts that emerged when
we tried to extend observed trends so far. Although we have not tried to estimate figures
for HE based on this approach we believe this is a sound way to overcome the limitations
of the simple procedures attempted before. Moreover, the results just commented are
compatible with the scenarios also discussed previously.56
6.  Living longer, working less, keeping better? Towards a new demographic
transition
On the basis of the comparison of the different data sets we have concluded that
ageing is a process that all countries have been experiencing, with different degrees and
starting points, since the last few decades and that will continue, given current trends, in
the coming decades.
Ageing is due both to longer average life years and fewer births. Life expectancy
has been increasing dramatically since one hundred years ago, and this has been compatible
both with expansion (people reaching higher extreme ages) and with compression (more and
more people surviving at all ages) of mortality. However, in the last three decades,
compression of mortality at adult ages has been dominant in the process of ageing rather
than expansion for the generality of countries. Expansion on the other hand, means a higher
limit for the human life what, if strictly defined, is not the case being observed. Relatively
few people reach extreme ages that only with numbered exceptions surpass 110 years of age
while survivors shares (for a given generation) at 80, for instance, have typically increased
from 30% to 60% or more in the last 30 years.
Life courses indicators have allowed us to document, with varying accuracy due to
data availability for different countries, a general trend in the EU towards longer years in
school, delayed entrance to the labour market, delayed emancipation from parental home,
delayed household formation and first parenthood, earlier retirement and longer post
retirement spans. Some of these trends, as it is well known, clash with each other as it is
the case of shorter working lives and longer post retirement spans.
Morbidity (health status or disability) puts a check on the quality with which longer
lives can be lived. Data on these issues have not been yet comprehensively analysed due to
the rarity and lack of homogeneity of health and disability surveys in different countries.
Nevertheless, the European Panel has allowed us to document health and disability status in
EU countries and to use this information to compute Adjusted Life Expectancies either for
years lived in good health or free of disability. Although some indications for some
countries point to the fact that longer lives do not necessarily mean to be lived in better
health or with less prevalence of disabilities, when the recent past is analysed with the
ECHP data, in general, we can establish scenarios that quite naturally imply increased57
portions of increased post-retirement or adult lives lived either in better health or free of
disability. Health and disability status however is self-reported and this makes data fraught
with problems and hard to compare among countries. We have shown this using the ECHP
data what points to the need of being extremely careful as for making country comparisons
on this matter. The close link we have established among education and health status has
allowed us nevertheless to support our naïve scenarios for generally improved future health
Expectancies.
All in all, European countries have had since the mid past century what could be
termed, following van de Kaa (1987), a “second demographic transition” concerning the
evolution of fertility and mortality. It is not easy to say whether the absolute limit to a
human life has increased, but what is more than certain is that survival at high or even
extreme ages has experienced a dramatic change in the last decades in Europe. Not less
have changed life styles and behaviours, if we trust our “lifecourses” indicators that warn
us about possible unsustainable combinations of trends that will have to be contained before
society discover too late that liabilities are much higher than assets of any kind. Activity
seems to be the most abundant and most wasted resource in western countries whereas
health and disability problems seem to be checked as post retirement life spans increase,
although not everywhere.
Ageing will continue in the future even at an accelerated speed, at least when
defined in the rather strict manner we still define it (65s and over). Health and disability
limitations would probably advance less rapidly than age thus allowing for healthier life,
but this is not granted necessarily as analyses based on available data still lack
conclusiveness. Despite the enormous advancement in health in developed countries, ageing
critically exposes people to new forms of morbidity. Perhaps some future day we could
speak of a “third demographic transition” in Europe (and everywhere). That of a more
balanced equilibrium between age spans within the life cycle, healthier lifestyles, more
active and less dependent old age lives or improved options as for the transition from work
to retirement.58
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